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THE PREFERENCE CLAUSE REVISITED: CENTRAL
LINCOLN PEOPLES' UTILITY DISTRICT V. JOHNSON
AND THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ELECTRIC
POWER PLANNING AND CONSERVATION ACT
Joseph P. Mentor Jr.*
David C. Jory**
Historically, federal statutes gave public bodies and nonprofit coopera-
tive organizations a preference over private entities in the sale of hydroe-
lectric power from federally owned hydroelectric dams.I Congress en-
acted power-marketing and land reclamation statutes2 authorizing federal
agencies to sell hydroelectric power to public and private utilities and di-
rectly to certain large industries.3 Congress allowed electric power sales
to private interests, however, only after the agencies satisfied the needs of
governmental bodies and publicly owned utilities. 4
The original purpose of the preference for public entities was to dispose
of surplus electric power, produced as a by-product of irrigation develop-
ment, in a way that would encourage domestic use of electricity, espe-
* J.D., Washington & Lee University School of Law, 1982; B.A., University of Puget Sound,
1979; Member, Washington State Bar; Law Clerk to Hon. James Dolliver, Washington Supreme
Court; Staff Assistant to Norman D. Dicks, M.C., 1980.
** J.D., Willamette University College of Law, 1978; B.A., Willamette University, 1975;
Member, Oregon State Bar; Legislative Assistant to Jim Weaver, M.C. The authors would like to
thank Andrew W. McThenia, Jr., for his encouragement.
I. For a detailed historical description of the preference clause, see Comment, The Meaning of
the Preference Clause in Hydroelectric Power Allocation Under the Federal Land Reclamation Stat-
utes, 9 ENvrL. L. 601 (1979). See also Redman, Preference and Other Clauses in Federal Power
Marketing Acts (to be published in 13 ENvmn. L. (1983)) (suggesting that the preference concept has
not been a consistent element of federal power marketing policy). Many federal statutes contain
preference clauses favoring public agencies and nonprofit organizations. See, e.g., Falcon Dam Act,
ch. 310, 68 Stat. 255 (1954); Flood Control Act, ch. 665, §§ 1-8, 15, 58 Stat. 887, 887-91, 907
(1944) (codified in scattered sections of 16, 33, 43 U.S.C.); Reclamation Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§
387, 485h (1976); Fort Peck Act, 16 U.S.C. § 833c (1976); Bonneville Dam Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C.
§ 832c (1976); Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831i-8311 (1976); Boulder
Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. § 617d (1976); Federal Water Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825g
(1976); Reclamation Act of 1906, 43 U.S.C. § 522 (1976).
2. Power marketing statutes authorized particular federal agencies to sell electric power produced
at federally owned hydroelectric facilities. See, e.g., Bonneville Dam Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C. §§
832-832a (1976) (Bonneville Power Administration); Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16
U.S.C. § 831 (1976) (Tennessee Valley Authority).
3. E.g., Reclamation Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 485h (1976); Bonneville Dam Act, 16 U.S.C. §
832a(a) (1976); Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831i (1976).
4. E.g., Reclamation Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976); Bonneville Dam Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 832c (1976); Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831i (1976).
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cially in rural areas of the nation. 5 During the early decades of the twenti-
eth century, private utilities were not willing or able to serve rural areas at
a reasonable price to consumers, apparently because of the great expense
of constructing transmission facilities. 6 Additionally, preference clauses
evolved as antimonopoly provisions intended to prevent private interests
from gaining control of electric power development on public lands. 7 By
the 1930's, members of Congress acknowledged a growing concern that
the nation's electricity producing resources were falling under the control
of "power trusts" of private interests. 8 The profit motives of the power
trusts presented a sharp contrast to the government's goal of rural electri-
fication.9
In addition to these antimonopoly and rural electrification goals,
preference clauses manifest the belief that publicly owned resources be-
long to the nation's people and that federal agencies should distribute
them directly to the citizenry whenever possible. 10 Theoretically, the fed-
5. Comment, supra note 1, at 621-23. Congressional comment on the purposes of early legisla-
tion indicated a clear intent to provide low-cost federal electric power to homes and farms. Id. at 623.
6. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION. COLUMBIA RIVER POWER FOR THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF
POLICIES OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION 138 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BPA HISTORY].
Generally, privately owned utilities set rural electric service rates higher than that charged in more
densely populated areas. Private utilities often insisted on a cash contribution from rural customers,
generally equal to the cost of extending transmission lines to serve them. Id.
7. Id. at 74 (quoting Oregon Senator McNary that a preference clause is really "an antimonopoly
clause"). As early as 1908, President Theodore Roosevelt expressed his concern that monopolies
would gain control over public resources: "We are now at the beginning of great development of
water power .... Already the evils of monopoly are becoming manifest; already the experience of
the past shows the necessity of caution in making unrestricted grants of this great power." Theodore
Roosevelt, Rainy River Veto Message (Apr. 13, 1908), quoted in BPA HISTORY, supra note 6, at 2 1.
8. See, e.g., 77 CONG. REC_ 2280 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Weidman); 66 CONG REC 1074
(1925) (remarks of Sen. Norris).
9. Rural electrification became a symbol of economic recovery during the Great Depression be-
cause it provided jobs for the unemployed, and cheap abundant power for the farms and cities. N.
CLARK. WASHINGTON: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 155 (1976). The goal of rural electrification was a
major issue in the 1930 congressional elections and in the 1932 presidential campaign of Franklin
Roosevelt. BPA HISTORY, supra note 6, at 98. In a radio address on April 7, 1931, Roosevelt said:
From the very beginning I have held to a consistent course and a consistent objective. I have
fought all along for development of this power by an agency of the state itself and not by any
private corporation. Furthermore, I have fought from the very beginning for the use and distribu-
tion of this power for the great purposes of bringing more and more electricity into the homes of
the state, into the small shops and industries, into the farms and into the flats.
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 201 (1938), quoted in Comment, supra
note 1, at 620 n.67.
10. From the earliest days of the republic, federal land disposal policies imposed limitations on
any individual's right to acquire portions of the public domain or public property. Comment, supra
note I, at 618 n.63. President Thomas Jefferson urged that the government limit any individual's
right to acquire public property so that as many citizens as possible be allowed a small portion of
public land. THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 18 (memorial ed. 1904), quoted in Comment.
supra note 1, at 618 n.63. Cf. 3 H. ICKES. THE SECRET DIARIES OF HAROLD ICKES 101 (1954) (noting
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eral government holds in stewardship the nation's resources. I 1 Thus,
whenever the government makes natural resources available for use, it
should provide every citizen with the opportunity to use that resource
without paying a profit to other individuals. 12 If it is impractical to make
the resource available directly to every citizen, the government should
make the resource available to organizations whose purpose is to distri-
bute the resource at the lowest possible cost to the individual. 13 Through
preference clauses, Congress attempted to ensure that the benefits of fed-
eral water power projects flow directly to the public. 14
Although preference clauses have been prevalent throughout the his-
tory of federal power legislation, the meaning of the preference concept
and its application have not been static. 15 Congress has elaborated on the
preference concept in a plethora of power marketing and land reclamation
legislation. 16 The judiciary has contributed to the developing meaning of
preference clauses by consistently interpreting the clauses to confer a pri-
ority status on public agencies and publicly owned utilities. ' 7
This article analyzes the legislative development of the preference
clause to its inclusion in the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act). This analysis demonstrates
the Northwest Power Act's reaffirmation of the supply preference tradi-
tionally included in federal power marketing legislation. The analysis
also reveals a unique price discount for customers entitled to a supply
preference under the Northwest Power Act. Additionally, the article con-
siders recent Ninth Circuit decisions applying the preference clause to
various forms of power allocation by federal agencies. The analysis
identifies legislative and judicial adherence to the preference concept
based on congressional confidence in the principles underlying the prefer-
ence concept. The article concludes that Congress and the federal courts
have strengthened the priority given to public utilities in the Pacific
President Franklin Roosevelt's desire that federal land disposal and irrigation policies benefit small
farmers).
I1. See Potamkin, The Preference Clause is Fair-And Necessary, 18 MONT. L. REv. 3, 6
(1957).
12. See G. PINCHOT, THE FIGHTFOR CONSERVATION 11-12 (1910). See generally Bates, Fulfilling
American Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 44 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 29 (1957), re-
printed in THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT: READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF CONSERVATION 79 (R. Nash 2d
ed. 1976) (discussing conservationists' concern with economic justice and democracy in allocating
resources).
13. Potamkin, supra note I I, at 10.
14. See id.
15. See generally Comment, supra note I (survey of early reclamation laws, power production
type reclamation laws, and labor irrigation type reclamation laws, and the evolution and application
of preference laws); Redman, supra note I (same).
16.' See supra note I (partial list of federal statutes containing preference clauses).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 87-122.
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Northwest to federally generated electric power despite attempts to cir-
cumvent or erode preference rights.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREFERENCE
CONCEPT
Throughout the twentieth century, Congress has included preference
clauses in a number of power allocation and land reclamation statutes. 1 8
Congress established the fundamentals of federal power allocation policy
in the Reclamation Act of 190619 (Reclamation Act) to provide for the
irrigation of vast acreages of public lands in the West. Although hydroe-
lectric power generation was not a primary purpose of the Reclamation
Act, the Act nonetheless provided directly for the disposition of hydroe-
lectric power. 20 The Reclamation Act required the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to give a preference to power sales for municipal purposes. 21
In later legislation, Congress continued to grant preferences to publicly
owned utilities in the sale of power from federal water projects. The
Boulder Canyon Project Act 22 required the Secretary of the Interior to
give preference to public entities when selling hydroelectric power from
the Boulder Canyon Project on the Colorado River. 23 The Tennessee Val-
ley Authority Act of 193324 (TVA Act) represented a further application
of the preference concept. Specifically, the Act required the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) to give preference to states, counties, municipal-
18. See supra note 1. Previously, the federal reclamation statutes required the government to
offer surplus water from irrigation projects for public use. L. WHITE, THE RIGHT TO FEDERALLY GEN-
ERATED POWER 9 (June 19, 1979) (published by the American Public Power Association). The first
statute granting an actual preference in the distribution and use of public resources was the Desert
Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976).
19. Reclamation Act of 1906, ch. 1631, 34 Stat. 116-17, 43 U.S.C. § 522 (1976). Although
Congress included preference clauses in earlier statutes dealing with public resources, see supra note
18, the Reclamation Act of 1906 was the first to provide directly for the disposition of hydroelectric
power from federal dams. Comment, supra note 1, at 610.
20. The Act provided the Secretary of the Interior with authority to dispose of surplus electric
power from irrigation projects undertaken by the Interior Department. 43 U.S.C. § 522 (1976).
21. Id. The Act's preference clause required the Secretary of the Interior to guarantee a prefer-
ence to power sold for municipal purposes. Id. In later legislation, Congress granted preferences to
governmental bodies organized for the public benefit instead of limiting the ways purchasers could
utilize power generated at public facilities. L. WHITE, supra note 18, at 11.
22. Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-618p (1976).
23. 43 U.S.C. § 617d(c) (1976). Under the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the government con-
structed no power lines or generators. Instead, the Secretary of the Interior licensed customers to
install their own generating equipment in the project's Boulder Dam facility. See Comment, supra
note 1, at 615. The Act required the Secretary to wait a reasonable time before denying the applica-
tion of a public body on the grounds that the applicant did not have the financial capability to con-
struct generation and distribution facilities. 43 U.S.C. § 617d(c) (1976).
24. Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-83 1dd (1976).
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ities and nonprofit organizations of citizens or farmers, and to include
five-year cancellation clauses in contracts with privately owned utili-
ties. 25 Additionally, the Act authorized the TVA to construct its own
transmission lines to serve farms and small villages not otherwise sup-
plied with reasonably priced electricity and to acquire existing electric
facilities to provide power directly to rural consumers. 26 Finally, the Act
granted preference customers time to comply with local laws pertaining to
their authorization as legal contracting agencies before allowing the TVA
to contract with private utilities.27
The Bonneville Project Act 28 (Bonneville Act) represented another ap-
plication of the preference concept. The Act created the Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA) to act as marketing agent for the sale of
hydroelectric power generated by the Bonneville Dam on the Columbia
River. 29 Congress authorized the BPA30 to construct and operate electric
transmission lines in the Pacific Northwest and to market electricity pro-
duced at regional federal power projects. 31 Although the Bonneville Act
allowed the agency to sell hydroelectric power to privately owned utilities
and large industrial customers as well as to "public bodies and cocpera-
tives, '"32 the Act's preference clause required that the BPA give prefer-
ence to non-federal government agencies and publicly-owned utilities and
cooperatives. 33 The preference clause of the Bonneville Act is almost
identical to provisions in the TVA Act. 34 The Bonneville Act included
25. Id. § 831i (1976).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 831k.
28. Bonneville Project Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 832-8321(1976).
29. Id. § 832a(a) (1976). See infra text accompanying note 31.
30. The Bonneville Act created the BPA to act as marketing agent for electric power produced at
the Bonneville Dam on the Columbia River. Congress later expanded the agency's marketing author-
ity to encompass power produced at all federally owned dams in the Pacific Northwest. See generally
Foote, Larsen & Maddox, Bonneville Power Administration: Northwest Power Broker, 6 ENvTL. L.
831 (1976) (tracing the development of the BPA from an obscure federal agency to an agency ac-
tively involved in planning for the future of the Pacific Northwest) [hereinafter cited as Foote].
31. 16 U.S.C. § 832a(a)-(b) (1976). Construction of Bonneville Dam began in 1933 as Public
Works Project No. 28. Comment, supra note 1, at 625 n.85. The Bonneville Dam was the first
project over which the BPA had authority. President Franklin Roosevelt brought Grand Coulee Dam,
also on the Columbia River, under the Bonneville Power Administrator's authority. See Exec. Order
No. 8526, 5 Fed. Reg. 3390-91 (1940). Administration of the Grand Coulee Project was subject to
the requirements of the Bonneville Act's preference clause. Id.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 832d(a) (1976).
33. Id. § 832c(a) (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 34-38.
34. Comment, supra note 1, at 626-27. The Bonneville Act contained two important clarifica-
tions of the public preference concept. The first is that Congress contemplated a wide geographic
distribution of hydroelectric power produced at the Bonneville Dam and other federal facilities. See
16 U.S.C. § 832a(b) (1976). The Act encouraged the people of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and
Montana to create public or cooperative agencies so as to qualify for the public power preference. See
id. at § 832c(d). Second, the Act prevented circumvention of the preference clause caused by prefer-
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cooperatives as preference customers, 35 authorized construction of fed-
eral transmission lines, 36 and required that contracts with private utilities
include five-year cancellation clauses. 37 Like the TVA Act, the Bonne-
ville Act provided public entities with a reasonable opportunity to finance
entry into the power business as preference customers. 38
Over the next several years, Congress passed four additional prefer-
ence power statutes. The Fort Peck Act, 39 the Reclamation Project Act, 40
and the Water Conservation and Utilization Act 4' each included clauses
guaranteeing a preference to public bodies and cooperatives in power
sales from federal multipurpose dams. 42 Likewise, the Flood Control
Act 43 contained a preference clause. 44 After considerable debate, 45 Con-
ence customers reselling electric power to private utilities, by forbidding resale, except by a private
utility, of electric power to any agency engaged in the sale of electricity to the general public. Id. §
832d(a).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 832c(a) (1976). See also Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. §
831 i (1976) (also including cooperatives as preference customers).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 832a(b) (1976). Congress authorized the BPA to construct and operate transmis-
sion lines to encourage the widest possible use of electricity and to prevent monopolization of electric
energy by limited groups. Id. See also Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831k
(1976) (also authorizing construction of federal transmission lines).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 832d(a) (1976). See also Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. §
831i (1976) (also requiring five-year cancellation clause in contracts with private utilities).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 832c(c) (1976). Congress intended the "reasonable time" requirement to en-
courage the formation of cooperatives and other nonprofit retail organizations. Comment, supra note
1, at 628 n.90. A similar requirement appears in the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C.
§ 617d(c) (1976), and in the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 83 1k (1976).
39. Fort Peck Act. ch. 250, 52 Stat. 403, 16 U.S.C. 88 833-833q (1976). Congress designed the
Fort Peck Act to provide power to consumers in Eastern Montana and to improve navigation on the
upper Missouri River. The Act's preference provisions were patterned after the preference provisions
of the Bonneville Act. Comment, supra note 1, at 632 n. 102.
40. Reclamation Project Act, ch. 418, 53 Stat. 1193, 43 U.S.C. §§ 375a, 387-389, 485-485b
(1976). The Act applies to all reclamation projects authorized under federal law and was intended by
Congress to supplement all preceding reclamation legislation. See Comment, supra note I, at
635-36. The Act requires the government, when selling surplus power from all its reclamation proj-
ects, to give preference to municipalities and other government agencies and to cooperatives and
other nonprofit organizations. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c).
41. Water Conservation and Utilization Act, ch. 861, 54 Stat. 1124, 16 U.S.C. § 590y-590z
(1976).
42. See, e.g., Fort Peck Act, 16 U.S.C. § 833 (1976); Reclamation Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §
485h(c) (1976); Water Conservation and Utilization Act, 16 U.S.C. § 590z(7) (1976).
43. Flood Control Act, ch. 665, § 1-8, 15, 58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified in scattered sections of
16, 33, 43 U.S.C.).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 825s (1976).
45. See 90 CONG. REC. 8243 (1944). During Senate debate on the Flood Control Act, Sen. Bailey
of North Carolina offered an amendment to the bill calling for sales of electricity directly from the
generating facility with no preference. Id. at 8315. The Bailey amendment provided for the sale of
electric power at the point of production, without special privilege or discrimination, to provide for
the complete coordination of power development, both public and private, in the areas adjoining
federal projects. Id. The Senate rejected the Bailey amendment. The final version of the bill simply
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gress included a preference clause in the Flood Control Act that applied
the Bonneville principles to all Corps of Engineers hydroelectric proj-
ects .46
II. THE PREFERENCE CONCEPT REVISITED: THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER PLANNING AND
CONSERVATION ACT
Until recently, the Bonneville Act's preference clause was of little
practical consequence. An abundance of hydroelectric power in the Pa-
cific Northwest permitted the BPA to provide ample electricity to both
private and public utilities. 47 Because of the vast amount of surplus power
available, the federal government in the 1940's and 1950's encouraged
electroprocessing companies to relocate in the region to stimulate eco-
nomic development. 48 By the 1960's, however, the situation had
changed. The BPA's commitments to preference customers under the
Bonneville Act nearly exhausted the agency's hydroelectric power sup-
ply.49 As the Bonneville Act's preference required, the BPA stopped sell-
ing power to the region's privately owned utilities. 50 The BPA proposed
read, "preference in the sale of such power and energy shall be given to public bodies and coopera-
tives." 16 U.S.C. § 825s.
46. 16 U.S.C. § 825s (1976). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers presently operates twenty
multipurpose dams in the Columbia River Basin. Hittle, Larson, Randall & Michie, Pacific North-
west Power Generation, Multipurpose Use of the Columbia River and Regional Energy Legislation:
An Overview, 10 ENVTL. L. 235, 238 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hittle]. The Flood Control Act
entrusted the Secretary of the Interior with marketing responsibilities for surplus hydroelectric power
produced at U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dams. 16 U.S.C. § 825s (1976). Congress later trans-
ferred the Secretary of the Interior's electric power marketing responsibilities to the Secretary of
Energy. Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7152 (Supp. IV 1980).
47. H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONo. &
AD. NEws 6023, 6025-26 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II].
48. Hittle, supra note 46, at 245. Electroprocessing industries in the Pacific Northwest primarily
manufacture aluminum. During World War II the federal government sought to expand production of
aluminum needed for the war effort. By 1942, the BPA's power sales commitments to electropro-
cessing industries totaled almost 900 megawatts, approximately 92% of the agency's commitments.
BPA HISTORY, supra note 6, at 123.
49. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS. ELECTRIC POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST 131-35 (1980).
50. See 16 U.S.C. § 832c(a) (1976). The BPA ceased sales of power to privately owned utilities
when the private utilities' power sales contracts expired in 1973. H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, supra
note 47, at 6027. Consequently, private utilities were forced to construct their own generating facili-
ties. By 1980, the generating capacity of private utilities in Washington, Oregon, Idaho and Montana
totaled over 5200 megawatts of electric power. E. CARLSON, J. ELORRIAGA & G. WEYERHAEUSER,
GOVERNORS' PANEL. A REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES FACING THE REGION
ON WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNITS 4 AND 5 11-0 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gov-
ERNORS' PANEL REPORT]. Together, the region's private utilities generated over 46 million megawatt-
hours of electric energy in 1980. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 54
(1981) [hereinafter cited as 1980 BPA ANNUAL REPORT].
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to allocate "firm power" resources51 among preference customers. 52 The
agency continued to honor existing contracts by selling "interruptible" or
"nonfirm" power, 53 directly to large industrial customers, 54 but an-
nounced that it would be unable to renew those contracts when they ex-
pired.
Partly to resolve the competing claims to the increasingly valuable hy-
droelectric power resource, Congress enacted the Northwest Power
Act. 55 The Act is the most recent pronouncement of congressional policy
51. Firm power resources are those electric power resources that are available at all times, even
under adverse conditions. The BPA determines the quantity of firm power available by calculating
the Columbia River's lowest 42-month streamflow period of historic record. The agency character-
izes the amount of power that would be available during a recurrence of the critical water period as
firm power. Michie, Impacts of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act
on the Development of Energy Resources in the Pacific Northwest: An Analysis of the Resource Ac-
quisition Priority Scheme, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 299, 307 n.29 (1981). See also GOVERNORS'
PANEL REPORT, supra note 50, at 111-3 (another discussion of "critical water").
52. See H.R. REP No. 976, Part II, supra note 47, at 5989-90. The BPA published notice of its
proposed allocation policy on October 5, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 57,824 (1979). The agency planned to
limit preference customers to a pro rata share of the BPA's firm power supply after 1991. H.R. REP
No. 976, Part II, supra note 47, at 6029.
53. Interruptible or nonfirm power is the amount of power in excess of firm power produced
when the Columbia River exceeds critical water levels. Interruptible power is delivered to customers
who are permitted to use it as long as it is not needed for the firm power loads of any BPA customers.
If a shortage develops, the BPA interrupts the supply of interruptible nonfirm power made available
to nonpreference customers. Hittle, supra note 47, at 249 n.75.
54. See H.R. REP. No. 976, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD NEws 5994-95 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP No. 976, Part 1]. Prior to enactment of
the Northwest Power Act, infra note 55, the BPA sold power directly to fifteen large industries,
referred to as "DSIs." Id. at 5994. The following chart presents a list of the BPA's DSI customers,
their locations, their contract expiration dates and contract demand amounts as of March I, 1979:
Contract Demand
Customer Expiration (in megawatts)
Aluminum Companies:
Alcoa ..... ... ........................ .June 15, 1987 . . . .520
Anaconda Co ........ ...................... Sept. 8, 1987 . . . . 379
Intalco ...... ... ..................... Oct. 22, 1984 . . . . 438
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp ................ .. Oct. 10, 1986 . . . . 674
Martin-Marrieta Aluminum Corp ................. .Feb. 13, 1988 . . . . 380
Reynolds Metals Co ..... ................... .Dec. 28. 1986 . . . . 690
Other Companies:
The Carborundum Co ..... .................. .Dec. 31, 1985 . . . . 30
Crown Zellerbach Corp ..... ................. .Aug. 30, 1983 . . . . 14
Georgia Pacific Corp ...... ................... .July 6, 1984 . . . . 27
Hanna Nickel Smelting Co ..... ................ .June 26, 1990 . . . . 115
Oregon Metallurgical Corp ...... ................. May 7, 1988 . . . . 9
Pacific Carbide & Alloys Co .... ................ .Sept. 9, 1991 . . . . 8
Pennwalt Corp ...... ..................... .Dec. 31, 1985 . . . . 45
Stauffer Chemical Works ..... ................ .Apr. 22, 1988 . . . . 80
Union Carbide Corp ..... ................... .May 11. 1981 . . . . 12
H.R. REP. No. 976, Part 1, supra, at 5994-95.
55. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94
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regarding the preference concept and the sale of federally produced elec-
tric power. It follows decades of legislative silence on the subject. 56 The
Act requires the BPA to offer long term power sale contracts to: (1) pub-
licly owned utilities, 57 (2) federal agencies, 58 (3) privately owned utili-
ties, 59 and (4) industrial customers directly served by the agency. 60 It
expressly preserves the public-preference provisions of earlier federal
legislation, including the Bonneville Act.61
The Northwest Power Act is designed to combine and operate generat-
ing and transmitting facilities in the region as though a single utility
owned them. 62 The Act provides for creation of a regional power plan-
Stat. 2698 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 839-839h (Supp. V 1981)) [hereinafter cited as North-
west Power Act].
56. During the period from 1944 to 1954, Congress did nothing to alter the scope or substance of
the Bonneville Act's preference clause. In 1954, Congress passed legislation requiring the BPA to
purchase power generated by the Grant County, Washington, Public Utility District at Priest Rapids
Dam on the Columbia River. Priest Rapids Dam Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-544, 68 Stat. 573
(1954). Congress required the BPA to resell power from the Priest Rapids Dam according to the
marketing provisions of the Bonneville Act. Id. § 6, 68 Stat. it 574.
In 1978, Senator Jackson of Washington introduced a bill to eliminate the Bonneville Act's prefer-
ence provisions. S. 3418, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The unsuccessful Jackson bill would have
restructured the BPA's authority to allow distribution of federal power in the context of a single,
nondiscriminatory allocation framework. Id.
57. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 5(b), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b) (Supp. V 1981). The
Northwest Power Act requires the BPA to offer to sell public bodies and cooperatives the power
needed to meet their firm power needs to the extent their own resources are insufficient. Id. The Act
specifies that, in the event of an energy shortage, the BPA may not sell to preference customers an
amount of power less than its firm energy capability. Id. § 5(b)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b)(6) (Supp. V
1981). See H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, supra note 47, at 6045.
58. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 5(b), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b) (Supp. V 1981). The
Northwest Power Act authorizes the BPA to sell electric power to federal agencies as though they
were preference customers. H.R. REP'. No. 976, Part II, supra note 47, at 6045.
59. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 5(b), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b) (Supp. V 1981). The
Northwest Power Act requires that the BPA offer to sell privately owned utilities the power needed to
meet their firm power needs to the extent their own resources are insufficient. Id. § 5(b)(6), 16
U.S.C. § 839c(b)(6). The Act continues the Bonneville Dam Act's mandate that the BPA be able to
reduce its obligations to private utilities on five years' notice. Id. § 5(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b)(2).
See H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, supra note 47, at 46-47. See also supra text accompanying note 37
(contracts with private utilities include 5-year cancellation clause).
60. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 5(d)(l)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(l)(A) (Supp. V
1981). Under the Northwest Power Act, the direct-service industrial customers of the BPA are enti-
tled only to the equivalent amount of power available to them under their contracts with the BPA
dated January or April 1975 unless set criteria are met. Id. § 5(d)(l)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(1)(B).
61. Id. § 5(a), 10(c), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839c(a), 839g(c). The Northwest Power Act expressly sub-
jects all power sales by the BPA to the Bonneville Dam Act's preference clause. Id. § 5(a), 16
U.S.C. § 839c(a). Furthermore, the Act states that its provisions do not alter the preference require-
ments of other federal legislation to which the BPA is subject. Id. § 10(c), 16 U.S.C. § 839g(c).
According to Hittle, supra note 46, at 240-41, other federal legislation to which the BPA is subject to
include the Flood Control Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825s (1976), the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, Pub.
L. No. 79-14, 59 Stat. 10 (1945), and the Reclamation Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976). See
infra text accompanying notes 68-71.
62. See 126 CONG. REc. S14,693 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield). The
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ning council to develop a regional acquisition plan. 63 The Act authorizes
the BPA to purchase electric power resources to meet the region's energy
needs. 64 Assuming the availability of sufficient resources, 65 the Act re-
quires the BPA to offer long term power sale contracts to privately owned
utilities and direct-service industrial customers (DSIs) as well as to
preference customers. 66 Finally, the Act establishes rate directives that
"one-utility" concept, which represents an attempt to coordinate regional resource planning, market-
ing and generation activities, is the Act's major theme. Michie, supra note 5 1, at 305. To achieve the
one-utility objective, the Act provides for the development of a comprehensive regional energy plan.
Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 4(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(l) (Supp. V 1981). See infra
note 63. The Act authorizes the BPA to provide sufficient electric power to direct-service industries
and privately owned utilities as well as to preference customers. Northwest Power Act, supra note
55, § 5(d)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1981). See supra notes 59 & 60. The Act
authorizes the BPA to acquire the resources necessary to meet its customers' requirements. North-
west Power Act, supra note 55, § 5(c), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(c) (Supp. V 1981). See infra note 64. The
Act's rate directives, § 7, and residential power exchange provisions, § 5(c), attempt to preclude any
rate disparity between preference customers and residential and small farm customers of participating
private utilities. See 126 CONG. REC. S 14,694 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield).
63. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 839b (Supp. V 1981). The Northwest
Power Act establishes an eight-member Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning Council, two
members of which are appointed by the respective governor of each of the states of Idaho, Montana,
Oregon and Washington. Id. § 4(a)(1)-(3), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(l)-(3). The Act directs the Council
to prepare and adopt a regional conservation and electric power plan. Id. § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. §
839b(d). The Act requires that the plan include an energy conservation program, including model
conservation standards, a twenty-year demand and resource availability forecast, an analysis of cost-
effective methods of providing resources and a program for the protection and enhancement of fish
and wildlife on the Columbia River and its tributaries. Id. §§ 4(e)(3), 4(h)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. §§
839b(e)(3), 839b(h)(1)(A). The Act requires the BPA Administrator to act consistently with the
Council's plan. Id. § 4(d)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(d)(2).
64. Id. § 6(b), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(b). The Act authorizes the BPA to acquire from any available
source sufficient resources to meet contractual obligations to its customers. H.R. REP. No. 976, Part
11, supra note 47, at 6033. Specifically, it requires the BPA to first acquire all conservation and
renewable resources installed by residential and small commercial consumers and implement all con-
servation measures, including loans and grants for insulation and weatherization, that are consistent
with the Power Planning Council's conservation program. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, §
6(a), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(a) (Supp. V 1981). The Act requires the BPA, after taking into account
savings from conservation and renewable resource measures, to acquire nonrenewable resources
from the region's utilities and from sources outside the region. Id. § 6(b), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(b)
(Supp. V 1981). Congress intended the BPA's resource acquisition authority to obviate the need for
the agency to allocate a limited amount of federal resources among existing and potential claimants to
the resources. H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, supra note 47, at 6033. See generally Michie, supra note
51 (discussing the resource acquisition priority scheme and the resource selection process).
65. The Act premises the requirement that the BPA offer new long term power sale contracts to
private utilities and direct-service industrial customers on a "deemed" availability of sufficient re-
sources to meet the needs of preference customers. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 5(g)(7),
16 U.S.C. § 839c(g)(7) (Supp. V 1981). The Northwest Power Act does not affect the BPA's author-
ity under the Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 838i(b)(6) (1976), to
purchase power on a short term basis to meet temporary shortages. H.R. REP. No. 976, Part I, supra
note 54, at 6003.
66. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
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the BPA must follow when fixing rates for the power sold to preference,
private utility and DSI customers. 67
The Northwest Power Act preserves the traditional supply preference
by expressly incorporating the preference provisions of other federal leg-
islation, including the Bonneville Act. 68 As a preamble to the power sales
provisions, 69 the Northwest Power Act declares that all power sales
thereunder are subject to the preference and priority provisions of the
Bonneville Act.70 The Northwest Power Act's savings provisions also re-
fer to the preference concept, stating that nothing in the statute is intended
to affect the public preference provisions of other federal laws. 71
The rate directives of the Northwest Power Act are the source of the
Act's greatest impact on the historical preference concept. Previously, the
BPA did not differentiate among its customers regarding the sale price of
firm power. 72 In the Northwest Power Act, however, Congress set out
rate directives that give price discounts to preference customers and to
residential and small farm customers of private utilities. 73 Furthermore,
Congress established rate ceilings ensuring that preference customers pay
the lowest firm power rate.74 The rate ceilings mandate that preference
customers' rates will be no higher than if the Act had not required the
BPA to participate in power sales or purchase transactions with non-
preference customers. 75 In other words, preference customers' rates
should approximate the rates they would receive if the BPA were unin-
volved with nonpreference sales. Never before has a federal statute cre-
67. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
68. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, §§ 5(a), 10(c), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839c(a), 839g(c) (Supp.
V 1981). See H.R. REP. No. 976, Part I, supra note 54, at 5999-6000.
69. Northwest PowerAct, supra note 55, § 5(a), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(a) (Supp. V 1981).
70. Id. See Bonneville Dam Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-8321, discussed supra in notes 28-38 and
accompanying text.
71. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 10(c), 16 U.S.C. § 839g(c) (Supp. V 1981). See
supra note 61.
72. Prior to enactment of the Northwest Power Act, the Bonneville Act's rate directives required
only that the BPA fix rates to encourage the widest possible use of electric energy from the Bonne-
ville Project. 16 U.S.C. § 832e (1976). Congress allowed the BPA to set uniform rates to encourage
equitable distribution of electric energy throughout the region. Id.
73. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 7(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839e(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
Subject to the general requirement that the BPA set rates so that total revenues recover total costs, the
Northwest Power Act requires the agency to establish a three-tiered rate structure. H.R. REP. No.
976, Part II, supra note 47, at 6034, 6050. The rate directives reserve the lowest rates for preference
customers' firm power requirements and for power sold to private utilities to serve their residential
and small farm loads. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 7(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839e(b)(1) (Supp.
V 1981). A higher rate applies to private utilities' "load growth needs" and to power preference
customers' need to meet any "new large single loads" they may have. Id. § 7(f), 16 U.S.C. §
839e(f). DSIs have a special rate. Id. § 7(c), 16 U.S.C. § 839e(c).
74. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 7(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839e(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981). See
H.R. REp. No. 976, Part II, supra note 47, at 6050.
75. H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, supra note 47, at 6034.
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ated more than a priority in the right to purchase the power generated at
federally owned installations. 76 Under the Northwest Power Act, Con-
gress expanded the historical preference concept to encompass the price
of power as well as its availability. 77 Thus, the Act creates an entirely
new form of preference. 78
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE PREFERENCE CLAUSE
A. The Arizona Power Pooling and Santa Clara Decisions
The 1982 case of Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District v. Johnson79
was the Ninth Circuit's first opportunity to examine the Bonneville Act's
preference clause. 80 The Ninth Circuit, however, had previously inter-
preted similar preference clauses in the Reclamation Project Act 8' and the
Flood Control Act. 82 In Arizona Power Pooling Association v. Morton,83
the court applied the Reclamation Project Act's preference clause to gov-
ernmental sales of thermally generated electric power. The Colorado
River Basin Project Act 84 (Colorado River Act) authorized the purchase
of nonfederal thermal power for the Bureau of Reclamation's Central Ari-
zona irrigation project. The Colorado River Act authorized the Bureau,
subject to the preference provisions of the Reclamation Project Act, to
dispose of power purchased, but not yet needed, for the Central Arizona
Project. 85 The Bureau refused to sell surplus power to preference custom-
ers under the Reclamation Project Act, arguing that the Colorado River
Act allowed the agency to sell the power back to the private utility owners
of the thermal plant projects. 86 The Arizona Power Pooling court dis-
76. Potamkim, supra note 11, at 3, 5, cited with approval in BPA HISTORY, supra note 6. at 75.
77. Compare Bonneville Dam Act, 16 U.S.C. § 832e (1976) (allowing rate schedules for the
"widest possible diversified use") with Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. §
831n-834(f) (1976) (providing only for lowest possible rates).
78. See supra note 76.
79. 673 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1982), discussed infra in notes 96-115 and accompanying text.
80. On November 15, 1977, the City of Portland, Oregon filed suit against the BPA claiming that
the agency had unlawfully denied the city's application for power as a preference customer. City of
Portland v. Munro, No. 77-928 (D. Or., filed Nov. 14, 1977). The case appeared to be a major test of
the preference concept because the city's complaint alleged violations of the Bonneville Project Act's
preference provisions. On December 27, 1978, however, the court ruled that the case was not ripe for
adjudication because the city was not yet ready to receive power from the BPA even if the agency
were to grant the city's application. See Comment, supra note I, at 607 n.26.
81. Reclamation Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976).
82. Flood Control Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825a (1976).
83. 527 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1975).
84. Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556 (1976).
85. Id. §§ 1521-1528. Congress designed the Central Arizona Project to furnish irrigation and
municipal water to water-deficient areas of Arizona and New Mexico. 527 F.2d at 723.
86. 527F.2dat725.
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agreed, ruling that the Reclamation Project Act's preference clause con-
stitutes a specific directive prohibiting the sale of federal power to'a pri-
vate customer when a preference customer is willing to purchase the
power.87
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the Arizona Power Pooling decision in
City of Santa Clara v. Andrus.88 The Bureau of Reclamation refused to
supply Santa Clara's municipal utility system with firm power on the
grounds that all firm power was already committed to meet the growth
needs of other preference customers. 89 While denying the city's applica-
tion, the Bureau sold firm power to Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), a
private utility. 90 The Bureau made the sale with the understanding that it
could repurchase power from PG&E to meet the existing preference cus-
tomers' future load growth needs, an arrangement referred to as "bank-
ing" energy. 91 The Santa Clara court examined the form of the question-
able allocations in order to uncover their substance. 92 The court -ruled
that, regardless of characterization, the "banking" arrangement consti-
tuted a sale of power, subject to the preference provisions of the Reclama-
tion Project Act. 93 The Ninth Circuit held that a private utility could not
receive federally marketed power, even on a provisional basis, while the
Bureau denied power to a preference customer. 94
87. Id. at 727. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Bureau's argument that Congressional appropria-
tions in connection with the Central Arizona Project effectively "approved" of the disposition of
interim power to nonpreference customers and thus sanctioned any possible violation of the Colorado
River Basin Project Act's preference clause. Id. at 726. In CentralLincoln, the Ninth Circuit rejected
a similar argument made by the BPA and its direct-service industrial customers. 673 F.2d 1076, 1080
n.4 (9th Cir. 1982). The Central Lincoln defendants argued that the BPA informed Congress of the
agency's proposed interpretation of the Northwest Power Act while the Act was still pending and
that, in passing the legislation, Congress accepted the BPA's interpretation. Id.
88. 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
89. See 572 F.2d at 664. The Reclamation Project Act authorizes the Bureau of Reclamation to
sell surplus electric power generated at multipurpose federal reclamation projects. 43 U.S.C. § 485h
(1976). The Bureau's Central Valley Project, located in the Central Valley of California and its sur-
rounding mountains, generated the electric power involved in Santa Clara. 572 F.2d at 664.
90. 572 F.2d at 669-70.
91. Id. at 669. The Bureau of Reclamation and Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) had participated
in the banking arrangement since 1965. See id. at 670. The Bureau claimed that the arrangement
enabled it to meet existing preference customers' future load growth by repurchasing banked power
from PG&E when needed and distributing it to those users at that time. Id. at 669.
92. See id. at 670-71.
93. Id.
94. Id. The city argued further that the Bureau of Reclamation violated the Reclamation Project
Act's preference clause by providing other public entities with firm power while refusing to allocate
firm power to Santa Clara. Id. at 667. The Ninth Circuit rejected the city's argument. Id. at 668. The
Santa Clara court ruled that the Act's preference clause provides no law to apply in reviewing the
Bureau's allocation of federal electric power among preference customers. Id. The court concluded
that the preference clause does not prevent the Bureau from discriminating against some preference
entities to benefit others. Id.
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B. Back to the Courts: Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District v.
Johnson
As previously stated, the Northwest Power Act authorizes the BPA to
sell electric power to existing direct-service industrial customers. 95 The
Act directs that portions of the direct-service sales be interruptible to pro-
vide reserves for all the BPA's firm power needs and for preference cus-
tomers' nonfirm power needs. 96 The BPA interpreted the power sales pro-
visions of the Act to require the establishment of a reserve by giving DSIs
priority in purchasing nonfirm power. 97 The agency reasoned that inter-
ruptible sales of nonfirm power to DSIs are necessary to provide peaking
reserves 98 for preference customers' firm power needs. 99 According to the
BPA, however, Congress did not intend for DSI sales to provide reserves
for preference customers' nonfirm power needs. 0 0 In other words, the
BPA thought that it could interrupt DSI sales to provide for the preference
customers' firm power needs but not for their nonfirm power needs. 01
On August 28, 1981, relying on its interpretation of the Northwest
Power Act's power sales provisions, the BPA offered power sales con-
tracts to its DSI customers that obligated the agency to provide nonfirm
power to the DSIs before making it available to preference customers. 102
The DSI contracts called for a single class of "industrial firm" power 03
95. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 5(d), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d) (Supp. V 1981). See
supra note 60 and accompanying text.
96. See Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 5(d)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V
1981); Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility Dist. v. Johnson, 673 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.), amended, 686
F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1983) (No. 82-1071).
97. See 46 Fed. Reg. 44,340,44,348(1981).
98. Peaking reserves means having uncommitted power available to meet the highest demand
experienced during a given period of time. See Hittle, supra note 46, at 247 n.64. Peaking periods
vary in duration from minutes to hours. Id.
99. See 46 Fed. Reg. 44,340, 44,348 (1981).
100. Id. The BPA cited the Senate Energy Committee's report on the Act as authority for the
decision to deny preference customers access to nonfirm power. Id. The Senate Committee report
cryptically directs the agency to serve the first 25% of a direct-service industrial customer's operating
demand with nonfirm power resources operated by the agency as if they were firm. S. REP No 272.
96th Cong., Ist Sess. 59 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No 272].
101. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
102. 46 Fed. Reg. 44,340(1981).
103. Id. at 44,348. The Northwest Power Act requires the BPA to provide the DSIs with amount
of power available under the 1975 "industrial firm " contracts. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55.
§ 5(d)(l)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(1)(B)(Supp. V 1981). Industrial firm power under those contracts
was power made continuously available to direct-service customers, subject to curtailment in the
event of delayed completion, unexpectedly poor performance of generating facilities or conservation
measures, or unanticipated growth of preference customers' firm power loads. See S. REP No 272.
supra note 100, at 28. Industrial firm power is also subject to partial curtailment to provide forced
outage and peaking power reserves and to complete curtailment whenever frequency problems arise
on the regional transmission grid. H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, supra note 47, at 48.
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and divided service into four approximately equal "quartiles." 104 The
contracts authorized the BPA to restrict deliveries of power, in amounts
up to twenty-five percent of DSI demand, at any time and for any reason
in order to meet the agency's firm power obligations. 105 The contracts
explicitly stated, however, that the BPA could not restrict the first quartile
of power to sell nonfirm power to the BPA's preference customers. 106
In Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District v. Johnson, 107 a number of
public utilities sought a declaratory judgment that the August 1981 DSI
contracts violated the preference clause of the Northwest Power Act. 108
The utilities argued that the Northwest Power Act reaffirmed the prefer-
ence concept and applied it to all forms of power sales by the BPA. 109
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the utilities, holding that the preference
104. Under the 1975 and August 1981 contracts, each "quartile" represented 25% of a direct-
service customer's operating demand. 46 Fed. Reg. 44,340, 44,390 (1981).
105. Id. at 44,381. Under section 7(d) of the August 1981 contracts, the BPA could restrict
deliveries of an additional 25% of the direct-service customers' power demand, but only if the agency
was unable to meet its firm power obligations to preference customers due to delayed completion or
unexpectedly poor performance of regional generating resources or conservation measures imple-
mented or acquired by the agency. Id. at 44,382. The contracts did not allow the BPA to restrict
delivery of the second quartile of industrial firm power to meet the unanticipated growth of preference
customers' firm power loads. Cf. id. at 44,381-82 (first quartile restriction rights under the August
1981 contracts).
106. Id. at 44,382. Section 8(a)(2) of the August 1981 contracts prohibited the BPA from selling
nonfirm energy to preference customers if the energy could be used to serve the first quartile of the
direct-service customers' operating demand. Id. at 44,385. Section 8(c)(9) of the contracts provided
that the BPA would attempt to acquire additional energy before requiring the direct-service customers
to repay energy advanced to the first quartile. Id. at 44,387.
107. 673 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.), amended, 686 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1983) (No. 82-1071).
108. Id. at 1077-78. Section 9(e)(5) of the Act provides the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with
original jurisdiction to hear challenges to actions by the BPA and the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning Council. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 9(e)(5), 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5)
(Supp. V 1981). In CentralLincoln, the public utilities named as plaintiffs were the Central Lincoln
County Peoples' Utility District; City of Eugene, Oregon, Water & Electric Board; City of Seattle,
Washington, City Light Department; City of Tacoma, Washington, Department of Public Utilities;
Clatskanie County Peoples' Utility District; Northern Wasco County Peoples' Utility District; Public
Utility District No. 1 of Chelan County; Public Utility District No. I of Cowlitz County; Public
Utility District No. 1 of Douglas County; Public Utility District No. I of Snohomish County; Public
Utility District No. 2 of Grant County; and Tillamook County Peoples' Utility District. Second
Amended Complaint at 1, Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility Dist. v. Johnson, 673 F.2d 1076 (9th
Cir.), amended, 686 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. Mar. 25,
1983) (No. 82-1071).
109. 673 F.2d at 1077-78. The utilities and the BPA asserted that, prior to passage of the North-
west Power Act, the Bonneville Act entitled preference customers to purchase nonfirm energy before
the BPA could offer the energy to direct-service customers. Preference Customer Reply Memoran-
dum at 12, Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility Dist. [hereinafter cited as Reply Memorandum]. The
utilities argued that giving direct-service customers priority in buying nonfirm power would enable
those customers to receive a greater amount of power than they received under their previous con-
tracts in violation of section 5(d)(1)(B) of the Northwest Power Act. Id. at 8. See Northwest Power
Act, supra note 55, § 5(d)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. 839c(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
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provisions of the Northwest Power Act apply to firm and nonfirm power
alike. 110
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit in Central Lincoln ruled that the BPA
must provide nonfirm power to its preference customers prior to serving
the DSIs' first quartile.111 The court reasoned that application of the
preference clause to nonfirm power would interrupt first quartile service,
but argued that the interruption would result from insufficient power to
make the initial allocation of nonfirm power to the DSIs rather than from
the use of power already allocated to the reserve. 112 The Central Lincoln
court explicitly ruled that the initial allocation of nonfirrn power is subject
to the preference concept.113 It squarely rejected the BPA's contention
that interruption of nonfirm power to the DSIs violated the Act by making
the DSIs' nonfirm power allocation into a reserve for the preference cus-
tomers' nonfirm power needs. 114
IV. CONCLUSION-THE PREFERENCE CONCEPT IN THE
EIGHTIES: PRICE AS WELL AS AVAILABILITY
The Northwest Power Act is the most recent pronouncement of con-
gressional policy regarding the sale of federally produced and federally
acquired electric power. The Act explicitly preserves the public prefer-
ence concept by incorporating the preference and priority provisions of
the Bonneville Act and other federal power marketing legislation. 115
110. 673 F.2dat 1080-81.
111. Id. According to the BPA, the Northwest Power Act requires the agency to treat the direct-
service customers' first quartile of operating demand as if it were a firm obligation. See id. at 108 1.
As previously noted, the BPA cited the Senate Energy Committee's report as authority for its inter-
pretation of the 1980 Act. See supra note 100. The Central Lincoln court acknowledged the Senate
Committee report as providing some support for the BPA's interpretation. 673 F.2d at 1081. The
court ruled, however, that the Senate Committee's direction to the BPA to treat the direct-service
load "as if it were firm" was too ambiguous to support an exception to the preference provisions of
the Act. Id. at 1081 n.6.
112. Id. at 1080.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. In Central Lincoln, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that the Northwest Power Act's savings provisions explicitly reaffirm the preference to public bodies
established by the Bonneville Act. 673 F.2d at 1079. The Central Lincoln court found support for its
ruling in the reports of both House committees that considered the Northwest Power Act. Id. at 1081
n.5. The House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee stated that, when passing the Act, Congress
did not intend "'to interfere in any way with, or modify the statutory rights of preference customers
either within or without the region." H.R. REP. No. 976, Part 11, supra note 47, at 6024, quoted in
Central Lincoln, 673 F.2d at 1081 n.5. The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
declared that it did not want to "undo nearly 80 years of history or establish any precedent" which
"might be construed to change the meaning or application" of the preference clause. H.R. REP No
976, Part I, supra note 54, at 6000, cited in 673 F.2d at 1081 n.5.
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While the Northwest Power Act requires the BPA to offer power sales
contracts to private utilities and direct-service industrial customers, 116 the
assumption is that enough power will be available to first serve all the
power needs of the preference customers. 117
The Act's rate directives significantly expand the scope of the prefer-
ence concept. For the first time, Congress applied the preference concept
to the price of electric power as well as to its availability. The Act's rate
directives require the BPA to charge lower rates to preference customers
than to nonpreference customers. "18 The rate directives enable preference
customers to receive cost benefits from their preference rights for firm
power purchases. 119 Furthermore, the Act includes residential and small
farm customers of privately owned utilities (noted as public bodies and
cooperatives) as beneficiaries of many preference-customer rights. 120
Congress expanded the category of preference customers to preclude the
rate disparity that would otherwise result from the rate directive
scheme. 121
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Central Lincoln is the most recent judi-
cial interpretation of the public-preference concept. The Central Lincoln
decision is consistent with earlier Ninth Circuit decisions that give prior-
ity to preference customers in the sale of electric power, regardless of the
way that the sale is characterized by the agency. 122 According to the Cen-
tral Lincoln court, the preference concept continues to prohibit the sale of
electric power to nonpreference customers when the needs of preference
customers are unsatisfied. 123
By restoring preference customers access to nonfirm power, Central
Lincoln allows publicly owned utilities to reduce greatly the cost of power
to their customers. Many of the region's public utilities maintain and op-
erate their own power generating facilities. 124 Access to nonfirm power
116. See supra notes 59-60 & 66 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
119. H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, supra note 47, at 6046.
120. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 7(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839e(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
The Senate Energy Committee declared that a major purpose of the Northwest Power Act was to
extend the benefits of the Federal Columbia River Power System to the residential and farming con-
sumers of privately owned utilities. S. REP. No. 272, supra note 100, at 14.
121. See 126 CONG. REc. S14,694 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield).
122. E.g., City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859
(1978), discussed supra in notes 88-94 and accompanying text; Ariz. Power Pooling Ass'n v. Mor-
ton, 572 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976), discussed supra in notes 83-87
and accompanying text.
123. 673 F.2d at 1080. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
124. 673 F.2d at 1080. The following public utilities in the Pacific Northwest own and operate
their own generating facilities: City of Eugene, Oregon, Water and Electric Board (96,800 kilowatts
hydro, 51,200 kilowatts cogeneration, 500 kilowatts wind); City of Centralia, Washington, Electric
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provides the generating utilities with backup resources for their own facil-
ities. 125 When adverse water conditions or generating unit outages occur,
generating utilities will be able to purchase nonfirm power from the BPA
and thus guarantee their customers a continuous supply of electricity. 126
Access to nonfirm power also enables generating utilities to replace
power produced at their own facilities with generally cheaper, nonfirm
power, produced as surplus at federal facilities. 127 Whenever nonfirm
power is available from the BPA, generating utilities may either discon-
tinue their own generating or continue generation and sell their own
power to other purchasers.
Nongenerating public utilities may also derive benefits from the Cen-
tral Lincoln decision. Any preference customer may forego its initial pri-
ority to the BPA's firm power and purchase generally cheaper nonfirm
power instead. 128 Given the consistent seasonal availability of quantities
Light Department (10,000 kilowatts hydro); Chelan County Public Utility District (1,879,700 ki-
lowatts hydro); Cowlitz County Public Utility District (70,000 kilowatts hydro); Douglas County
Public Utility District (774,300 kilowatts hydro); Grant County Public Utility District (1.619,800
kilowatts hydro); Pend Oreille County Public Utility District (60,600 kilowatts hydro); City of Seat-
tle, Washington, City Light Department (1,276,800 kilowatts hydro, 750 kilowatts combustion tur-
bine, 30,000 kilowatts steam); City of Tacoma, Washington, Department of Public Utilities (659,700
kilowatts hydro); City of Bonners Ferry, Idaho (2400 kilowatts hydro, 2400 kilowatts diesel turbine);
City of Idaho Falls, Idaho (3000 kilowatts hydro). PACIFIC NORTHWEST UTILITIES CONFERENCE COM-
M-rIEE, NORTHWEST REGIONAL FORECAST OF POWER LOADS AND RESOURCES JULY 1982-JULY 1993, at
VII-I to -4 (1982). In addition, the following public utilities own portions of the 1,400,000 kilowatt
Centralia Steam Electric Project: Snohomish County Public Utility District (112,000 kilowatts);
Grays Harbor County Public Utility District (56,000 kilowatts); City of Seattle, Washington, City
Light Department (112,000 kilowatts): City of Tacoma, Washington, Department of Public Utilities
(112,000 kilowatts). OFFICE OF APPLIED ENERGY STUDIES, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY, WASH-
INGTON STATE ENERGY USE PROFILE, 1960-198 1, at 30-31 (1981).
125. Reply Memorandum, supra note 109, at 1.
126. See id. The BPA's direct-service customers contract with the agency to purchase available
nonfirm power. 673 F.2d at 1079 n.3. If a power plant outage occurs or energy peaks so that the BPA
cannot meet its firm obligations, the agency must interrupt delivery of power to direct-service cus-
tomers. Id.
127. For a discussion of this displacement option, see Redman, Nonfirm Energy and BPA's In-
dustrial Customers, 58 WASH. L. REV. 279, 287-89 (1983). Since nonfirm power is interruptible, it is
often sold by the BPA for less than firm power. Compare BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION,
WHOLESALE RATE SCHEDULES & GENERAL RATE SCHEDULE PROVISIONS A-I (Aug. 1982) (Schedule
PF-2, Primary Firm Power Rate) with id. at A-32 (Schedule NF-2, Nonfirm Energy Rate). In 1983.
the BPA will offer its preference customers continuous firm energy during peak hours at an average
rate of 18.2 mills per kilowatthour during the billing months of April and May. 14.4 mills per ki-
lowatthour during the billing months June through August and 15.02 mills per kilowatthour during
the billing months September through November. Id. at A- I. While the availability of nonfirm energy
depends on whether the Columbia River exceeds critical water levels, the price of nonfirm energy
depends on whether the river exceeds or is expected to exceed spill levels. When spill conditions exist
or are expected to exist, the BPA offers nonfirm energy at 9.0 mills per kilowatthour. Id. at A-32.
When the river exceeds critical water levels but spill conditions do not exist nor are they expected to
exist, the BPA offers nonfirm energy at 18.2 mills per kilowatthour. Id.
128. Utilities with nonfirm power sale contracts may not purchase nonfirm power to displace firm
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of nonfirm power, 129 and the supply of surplus power available outside
the region, 130 purchases of nonfirm power by nongenerating utilities
power the BPA is contractually obligated to supply. Id. at A-32. The Northwest Power Act required
the BPA to offer long term power sales contracts to existing public body and cooperative customers,
privately owned utility customers and direct-service industrial customers within nine months of the
effective date of the Act. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 5(g)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(g)(1)
(Supp. V 1981). Accordingly, on August 28, 1981, the BPA offered 20-year power sales contracts to
its customers. See 46 Fed. Reg. 44,340, 44,341-42, 44,349 (1981). The Northwest Power Act al-
lowed the BPA's customers one year from the date of offering to accept the BPA's proposed power
sales contracts. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 5(g)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(g)(2) (Supp. V
1981). The following public utilities refused to sign power sales contracts with the BPA: Public
Utility District of Mason County; Public Utility District of Pacific County; Pend Oreille County Pub-
lic Utility District; City of Canby, Oregon; City of Cascade Locks, Oregon; and City of Centralia,
Washington. Northwest Power Planning Council, Finally--the region signs on, I NORTHWEST EN-
ERGY NEWS No. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 3-4.
129. Nonfirm power is available only when the Columbia River exceeds critical water levels. See
supra note 53. See also Central Lincoln, 673 F.2d at 1078 n.1 (when water level is greater than
critical level, the power generated from the excess water is nonfirm energy). Planning experts expect
critical water conditions to recur only once every 160 years. Boly, Why the BPA Doesn't Want it to
Rain, Willamette Week, August 25-31, 1981, at I col. 5. Accord, GOVERNORS' PANEL REPORT, Su-
pra note 50, at 111-3.
130. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, INTERREGIONAL RESOURCE POTENTIALS: A SUR-
VEY OF POTENTIALS FOR THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ACQUIRING RENEWABLE RESOURCES FROM ADJOINING
REGIONS AND FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL INTERREGIONAL POWER EXCHANGES (June 1981) [hereinafter
cited as INTERREGIONAL RESOURCE POTENTIALS]. The Northwest Power Act requires the BPA to in-
vestigate opportunities for entering into arrangements for acquisition of resources from adjoining
regions. Northwest Power Act, supra note 55, § 6(l)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(l)(1) (Supp. V 1981). As
of this writing, the BPA has refused to estimate the amount of additional resources available outside
the region, or the reduction in intraregional nonrenewable generation requirements that could result
from interregional power exchanges. INTERREGIONAL RESOURCE POTENTIALS, supra, at iii. In 1981,
however, the British Columbia Hydro authority (BC Hydro) reported a surplus of 6.6 million me-
gawatt hours of energy and 3325 megawatts of peaking capacity. BRmSH COLUMBIA HYDRO AND
POWER AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT, 1980-81 (1981), quoted in Arlon R. Tussing and Associates,
Inc., Potential Markets in the Pacific Northwest and California for Surplus Electricity from British
Columbia 6, 8 (November 3, 1981) (unpublished memorandum) (copy on file with the Washington
Law Review).
Presently, power transmission interties owned by the federal government connect the Pacific
Northwest Region with the transmission systems of the Montana Power Company (MPC), the Idaho
Power Company (IPC), the Pacific Southwest Region, BC Hydro and the West Kootenay, British
Columbia, Power and Light Co. See generally INTERREGIONAL RESOURCE POTENTIALS, supra (survey
of existing and potential interties). The Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974
authorizes public utilities to utilize federal transmission facilities, including the interregional intertie
system. 16 U.S.C. § 838d (1976). The Act requires the BPA to make excess capacity in the federal
transmission system available to all utilities on a fair and nondiscriminatory basis. Id. "Potential
transactions" across interregional interties "include exchanges of capacity for firm offpeak energy,
seasonal exchanges of capacity or firm power to take advantage of diversity in loads, short-term
power purchases and sales, sharing of power systems' reserve generating capacity, coordination of
hydraulic operations to maximize use of storage reservoirs and provisional energy sales." INTER-
REGIONAL RESOURCE POTENTIALS. supra, at 20. The Act requires the BPA to charge rates for use of
the federal transmission system that equitably allocate the system's costs between federal and non-
federal users of the system. 16 U.S.C. § 838h.
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would be consistent with the utilities' statutory duty to provide a continu-
ous supply of power to their customers. 131
Read together, the Northwest Power Act and the Central Lincoln deci-
sion strongly reaffirm the preference concept. The Act represents Con-
gress' determination to preserve the Bonneville Act's preference clause; 1 32
Central Lincoln demonstrates the Ninth Circuit's unwillingness to toler-
ate administrative erosion of the preference concept. 133 Furthermore, the
Act's rate directives expand the preference concept to cover the price of
power as well as its availability. 134 Thus, Congress and the federal courts
have strengthened the priority of public utilities and cooperatives to
power sold by the BPA. After threatened extinction by legislative amend-
ment and administrative retraction, the preference concept continues to
greatly help its beneficiaries.
131. State statutes require utilities to exercise "public utility responsibility" toward their cus-
tomers. E.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 61-301 to -303 (1976); MoN CODE ANN § 69-3-201 to -209 (1981):
OR. REV STAT. § 757.020 (1981); WASH REV. CODE § 80.28.010 (1981). Public utility responsibili-
ties generally include the duty to serve upon reasonable demand all customers of the type and in the
territory the utility proposes to serve, the duty to render adequate service, the duty to serve customers
at reasonable rates and the duty to serve customers on a nondiscriminatory basis. See, e.g., WASH
REV. CODE § 80.28.010 (1981).
132. See supra notes 68-71, 115 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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